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The Right of Soviet Jews 
to Emigrate 
by Richard L. Flax 
At the beginning of the sixteenth cen-
tury, Anti-Jewish policy of the Muscovy 
Tsardom in Russia was expressed by hav-
ing Jews burnt at the stake for heresy. In 
1976, Aleksandr Lunts, a Soviet Jew, felt 
compelled to leave the Soviet Union due 
to the oppressive nature of Anti-Semitism 
in his homeland. Thus, from Tsarist 
Russia to the present Communist regime, 
the plight of the Russian Jew has been 
marred by institutionalized religious per-
secution. Fortunately, the technological 
advances of the twentieth century have 
created a "shrinking world" in which ev-
ery nation-state is put under microscopic 
global inspection. The results of these in-
ternational microscopic inspections have 
taken varied routes, such as war, apathy, 
alienation and interntional accord. Inter-
national law has been the primary catalyst 
in the evolution of peaceful results. To 
analyze the problems of the Soviet Jews it 
will be necessary to scrutinize the dictates 
of international law, and more important, 
in order to aid the Soviet Jews who suffer 
from persecution, resort must be had to 
international law and world opinion. 
The central thrust of this article will 
concentrate on the emigration of Jews 
from the Soviet Union. The total Jewish 
population of the Soviet Union is approx-
imately 2,000,000 people. As indicated 
Emigration of Soviet Jews 
(in thousands) 
30 
20 
o 
3.0 
[!:QJ THE FORUM 
32.02 
by the chart below, approximately 
119,359 Jews have emigrated from the 
Soviet Union during the years 
1969-1975. 
The right to emigrate has been 
proclaimed by international declarations, 
covenants, conventions and accords. 
SpeCifically, Article 13 of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Article 12 of the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Article 5 of the 1965 International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrmination and the Final Act 
of The Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (1975 Helsinki 
Accord) enshrine the right of emigration 
within the parameters of international 
law. 
The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. 
guarantees the same rights found in the 
international documents, supra. Article 
124 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., 
states: "In order to guarantee to citizens 
freedom of conscience, the church in the 
U.S.S.R. shall be separated from the state, 
and the school from the church. Freedom 
of religious worship and freedom of anti-
religious propaganda shall be recognized 
for all citizens." In addition, Article 123 
of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. states, 
"Equality of rights of citizens of the 
U.S.S.R., regardless of their nationality or 
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race, in all spheres of economic, state, 
cultural and SOCial-political life shall be 
an indefeasible law." 
International law and the municipal law 
of the Soviet Union afford Soviet Jews, as 
well as any other citizen, the right to 
freely observe their chosen religion. Yet, 
in application, these laws have taken a 
Kafkaesque twist, with the Soviet Jew 
caught in the middle. The Soviet Jew has 
become the pawn of a super-power and 
only recently has the "game" been docu-
mented by western correspondents. These 
news articles are now redundant in their 
narratives of Soviet Jews being jailed, 
Soviet Jews being sent to mental hospi-
tals, Soviet Jews being denied the sacra-
ments of their religion, Soviet Jews being 
denied permission to emigrate from the 
Soviet Union, Soviet Jews being han-
dicapped by quota systems in higher 
education. The Soviet Union denies all its 
citizens many basic human rights taken 
for granted in the West, but the Jews are 
treated worse than most. Despite its 
slogans about equality, communism has 
always been ambivalent on the Semitic 
question. 
Prior to discussing the import of inter-
national law on the right to emigrate, it is 
imperative to review the Soviet perspec-
tive on international law. Soviet jurists 
give narrower scope to the sources and 
subjects of international law than most 
Western authorities. Consequently, an ex-
amination of the obligations which the 
Soviets themselves accept is limited by 
this narrower outlook. Of the two primary 
sources of international law recognized by 
the Soviets-international treaties and in-
ternational customs-the former is con-
sidered paramount. The Soviets stress in-
ter-state negotiation leading to positive 
agreements as the basic source of law 
governing international relations. 
Nevertheless, a recent trend in Soviet 
public international law has been to ac-
cept certain decisions and resolutions of 
international organizations as a source of 
international law if they receive general 
international recognition. Whereas the 
Soviets recognize states, individuals and 
juridical persons as the subjects of munici-
pal law, they take the position that states 
are the only subjects of international law. 
Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly stated 
that the individual cannot be a subject of 
international law. Professor Novchan, a 
Soviet legal scholar, states that, "The 
theory that the individual is a subject of 
international law is incompatible with the 
nature of international law as interstate 
law and has very few supporters among 
international jurists. The exponents of 
such a cosmopolitan interpretation of 
human rights in essence completely 
negate the sovereignty of states and in 
fact, negate international law by replacing 
it with 'human right.' " 
Soviet Jews requesting permission to 
emigrate to Israel insist that their claim 
raises a right of repatriation. They point 
to the establishment of Israel as a Jewish 
state and repeatedly refer to it as their 
country and the homeland of the Jewish 
people. A prerequisite to an application 
for an exit visa is an invitation from a rela-
tive abroad, and every Soviet Jew who 
has applied to emigrate to Israel has rela-
tives there. The Soviet Government itself 
has recognized Israel as the homeland of 
the Jewish people. 
On December 10, 1948, the United Na-
tions General Assembly passed the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Universal Declaration) as a "common 
standard of achievement for all peoples 
and all nations." Article 13(2) of the 
Universal Declaration states: "Every per-
son has the right to leave any country, in-
cluding his own, and to return to his coun-
try." Although initially not binding under 
international law, since its adoption the 
Declaration has received widespread 
recognition and has taken on increased 
significance. The General Assembly, in 
two other resolutions, has declared the 
Universal Declaration to be binding. The 
view that the adoption of a resolution of 
an international organization on a ques-
tion of abstract legal principles constitutes 
important evidence of international law 
has gained increasing support. 
U Thant called the Universal Declara-
tion the "Magna Carta of Mankind." It is 
far more than a mere moral manifesto. 
The Universal Declaration is, by custom, 
becoming recognized as an expression of 
rules binding upon states. 
The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, passed unanimously 
by the General Assembly on December 
16, 1966, is a treaty which guarantees the 
right of emigration. Article 12 of the 
Covenant states, in part: 
(2) Everyone shall be free to leave any 
country including his own. 
(3) The above mentioned rights shall 
not be subject to any restrictions ex-
cept those which are provided by law, 
necessary to protect national security, 
public order, public health or morals or 
the rights and freedoms of others, and 
are consistent with the other rights 
recognized in this Covenant. 
(4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of the right to enter his own country. 
The Soviets claim that their legislation 
and rules of departure are in full accord 
with the Covenant. When the Soviets 
have not acted in accordance with the 
bare requirements of Article 12 (2) of the 
Covenant, they rely on the exceptions 
contained in Article 12 (3) to justify their 
actions. National security has been the 
most frequent reason given by the Soviets 
for denying exit visas. The question of na-
tional security is very much apposite to 
many cases of the so-called Jewish 
"refuseniks" (term applied to Jews who 
have been refused an exit visa) in the 
U.S.S.R., who have been denied the right 
to emigrate owing to alleged previous ac-
cess to State secrets. There probably are 
instances in which the Soviet government 
is genuinely and legitimately concerned 
about the possibility of security leaks as a 
result of emigration. The problems arise, 
however, from indiscriminate, and at 
times bizarre, application of this control 
device. The trouble is that there is no pro-
vision in the Soviet internal legal system 
clarifying the boundaries which encom-
pass national sec uri ty. If the clause 
regarding "national security" is not given 
a narrow interpretation, the effect could 
be to deny or dilute the right of emigra-
tion. To guard against use of these excep-
tions for arbitrary purposes, the standard 
suggested by Judge Ingles of the Philip-
pines could be applied. In a thorough 
study of the right of the individual to 
leave any country and return to his own, 
Judge Ingles recommehded that the use of 
the public order and national security ex-
ceptions be restricted to instances in 
which there is a "clear and pressing 
danger of injury." 
The official Soviet policy on this matter 
is to detain a national who has had access 
to classified information for a period of 
one to five years. In practice, however, 
Soviet Jews have been denied permiSSion 
to emigrate after such periods have ex-
pired. Until reasonable guidelines for the 
classifying of those subject to a "national 
security" label are established and 
followed by the Soviets, the denial of 
emigration rights to persons classified 
with this restrictive label is not justifiable. 
There is a powerful case to be made out 
that the Covenant is indicative of rights 
long since accepted as binding under 
general international law and that the 
Covenant binds States directly by virtue 
of its international legal status. Interna-
tional law thus recognizes, in the formula-
tion of Article 12 of the Covenant, a right 
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to emigrate. The Soviet Union has at no 
stage indicated that it does not regard the 
clause as a correct statement of the re-
quirements of international law or that it 
does not feel bound by the Covenant (in 
fact the Soviets ratified the Covenant on 
October 16, 1973). Indeed, the Soviet 
argument is that such a right is fully 
recognized by Soviet law. The argument, 
then, is not about the validity of this norm 
of international law, but about its applica-
tion in fact in the Soviet Union. Since the 
right is subject to certain reasonable con-
trols of the State, only the criterion of 
good faith can indicate whether the con-
trols are being applied for their legitimate 
purposes. 
In additcon to the Universal Declara-
tion and the Covenant, there is the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination. Article 5(d) (ii) of 
the Convention states that "the right to 
leave any country, including one's own, 
and to return to one's country" is guaran-
teed. The Soviet Union ratified this Con-
vention and is legally bound by its provi-
sions. Yet despite evidence of Soviet vio-
lations of the Convention, there appears 
to be no effective international remedy 
available to those individuals affected by 
the Soviet policy. Although the Conven-
tion provides for the establishment of a 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, its power is persuasive 
rather than coercive. It is directed to re-
port annually to the General Assembly 
and make recommendations based on re-
ports received from state parties. Only 
such parties may bring allegedly infring-
ing actions of other states before the 
Committee. Communications from in-
dividuals may be received only if the par-
ty charged has agreed to recognize the 
competence of the Committee on such 
matters, but this provision will not take 
effect until ten states have assented to 
such jurisdiction. Even though the 
possibility exists that another state party 
may raise the issue of Soviet discrimina-
tion against Jews, the U.S.S.R. will not 
recognize the Committee's jurisdiction 
over complaints originated by individuals. 
Moreover, the fact that enforcement pro-
visions are limited to recommendations to 
the General Assembly underscores the 
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purely advisory nature of the Committee's 
power. 
It should be noted that the Universal 
Declaration and the Covenant are no 
different from the Convention on the issue 
of enforcement. The advisory nature of 
these documents lend to their being 
classified as "paper tigers". Perhaps the 
most profound international statement on 
human rights in the twentieth century is 
the Helsinki accord. Signed on August 1, 
1975 by thirty-five nations, the Accord 
recognized the fundamental principles, 
among them Principle VII: "respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of thought, con-
science, religion or belief." 
The human rights principle, which 
represented the West's demand in ex-
change for recognizing post World War II 
boundaries in Europe, is specified in con-
crete terms in "Basket III" (the accord is 
divided into what has become commonly 
referred to as three "Baskets" -military 
security, economic cooperation and 
humanitarian cooperation) of the Accord. 
The Helsinki Accord was a coveted 
Soviet project for some twenty years prior 
to its conclusion in 1975. The Soviet 
Union long had sought Western recogni-
tion of its postwar pOSition in Eastern 
Europe through some statement concern-
ing the inviolability of frontiers. It is 
"Basket III", and in particular the human 
contacts and information texts, that were 
of greatest interest to the West and may 
have the most influence on future events. 
But the media colored the event as a dan-
gerous concession by the West. The 
general conclusion was that the President 
had demeaned himself by recognizing 
Soviet postwar domination in Eastern 
Europe without any substantial quid pro 
quo. George Ball was more vehement, 
calling it "a defeat for the West." 
Although the Helsinki Accord has 
caused a flurry of criticism, it is only a 
moral commitment and not legally bind-
ing. For this reason, the conference docu-
ment was cast in the form of a "Final 
Act" (in international practice a "Final 
Act" is not normally a legal instrument). 
The Helsinki Accord, then, is not a legal 
document and does not purport to state 
international law. It is viewed, however, 
as consistent with international law, and, 
given the level at which it was concluded, 
many observers think it may become in 
fact one of the most widely quoted 
sources of customary international law. 
On October 4, 1977 the thirty-five sig-
natories to the Helsinki Accord met in 
Belgrade, Yugoslavia to review the Ac-
cord. The conference was convened to 
check how the signatory nations have 
complied with the agreement reached in 
Helsinki. Before the meeting began, there 
were fears that it would become a bitter 
political wrangle between the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. over human rights. Arthur 
Goldberg, the Chief U.S. delegate, 
opened his remarks to the conference by 
reading off a list of human rights viola-
tions but named no names or countries. It 
appears as if both superpowers are at-
tempting to prevent any diplomatic 
chasms. Although the diplomats at 
Belgrade are behaving diplomatically, the 
start of the conference ignited demonstra-
tions and appeals to the West by Soviet 
Jewish dissidents. 
Since the Belgrade Conference is still in 
session, as this article goes to press, the 
outcome is unknown. Taking the risk 
which faces anyone who makes an edu-
cated guess, I believe the Belgrade con-
ference may create a few national bruises 
but lead to no blood letting. The super-
powers will vocalize their disappointment 
at "Basket III" violations, but immediate 
rectification will not occur. Yet, the docu-
ment will be a relentless diplomatic prob-
lem for the Soviets for many years to 
come. A ray of hope emanates from the 
mere fact that the U.S.S.R. even accepted 
a separate principle on human rights at 
Helsinki. Thus, the Soviets having 
acknowledged the desireability of "Basket 
III" concepts in one of their favorite inter-
national documents succeeded in focusing 
world attention on their observance of the 
Accord. 
All Soviet citizens, not just Jews, suffer 
from the Soviet Government's policy of 
militant atheism and its refusal to con-
sider emigration as a right rather than a 
rare privilege, as well as from other 
restrictions. But the limitations on Jews 
have in many important respects been 
more stringent. This is chiefly because 
Jews appear to be suspect in a special 
way-many have kin abroad in Israel, the 
United States, and Western Europe, and 
"Jewishness" in the Soviet Union has 
come to be regarded by a certain segment 
of Soviet officialdom as a more alien 
phenomenon than the fact of association 
with other major religious or national 
cultures in the U.S.S.R The Soviet 
regime has viewed the relationship be-
tween Soviet Jews and world Jewry with 
an anxiety bordering on political 
paranoia. A basic assumption is that the 
Soviets care about responsible public 
opinion abroad. In this sense the afore-
mentioned international documents lay 
the cornerstone for world public opinion 
to build upon. 
On June 15, 1970, a group of Soviet 
Jews were arrested in Leningrad for con-
spiring to hijack an airplane. Charged 
with attempted treason, they were con-
demned to death. The Supreme Court of 
the RS.F.S.R commuted the sentences to 
fifteen years. These "Leningrad Hijacking 
Trials" prompted a distinguished group of 
American attorneys-Alan Dershowitz, 
George Fletcher, Eugene Gold, Leon Lip-
son, Melvin Stein, Telford Taylor, and 
Nicholas Scoppetta-to form the Ameri-
can Legal Defense Project in order to 
challenge the validity of the Soviet crimi-
nal proceedings. These American lawyers 
filed petitions for the defendants in the 
"Leningrad Hijacking Trials". The Pro-
curator General of the U.S.S.R denied the 
relief requested by the American lawyers. 
Reflecting on this unique legal ex-
perience, Telford Taylor stated, "The 
reason why the trials were conducted as 
they were was exemplary. It was State 
policy to discourage Jewish emigration 
without appearing to prohibit it. Loss of 
jobs, apartments, and other privileges or 
necessities of Soviet life discouraged 
some, but by no means all, would be 
emigrants. Use of the criminal law was 
another and more drastic means to the 
same end." 
The past and recent events surrounding 
the plight of Jews within the Soviet Union 
brings us to a frequently asked question. 
Why doesn't the Soviet Union allow them 
to emigrate to Israel or elsewhere; why 
doesn't it encourage Jewish emigration? 
The answer to this question is complex 
and involves a myriad of ideological prin-
ciples which affect the socio-political 
fabric of the Soviet Union. 
For fundamental ideological reasons, 
the Soviet Union is closed and forbids 
emigration. The underlying premise is 
that the Soviet Union, which was the first 
to achieve communism, is the most ad-
vanced country in the history of man-
and all its peoples are content. Is it con-
ceivable, therefore, that large numbers of 
citizens within such an ideal society 
should be unsatisfied with their lives and 
ungrateful for their destiny? Why, then, 
should anyone wish to emigrate? 
But besides the ideological reason is a 
practical one as well. Despite their lack of 
sympathy for the Jews as a national 
group, the Soviet authorities are aware 
that the Jews are an important component 
of the Soviet economy. Jews serve as 
engineers, doctors, teachers, scientists, 
and artists. Take the Jews out of the 
Soviet mainstream and economic reper-
cussions will be felt. 
Another rationale for the Soviet 
Union's reluctance to allow mass emigra-
tion for its Jewish population is imbedded 
in the diplomacy of detente. Detente, by 
its very nature, calls for nation-states to 
partake in an international give and take. 
Any state involved in detente must be 
resigned to the fact that certain conces-
sions must be made in order to gain their 
own goals. The Soviet Jews have been en-
tangled within this international juggling 
act. Soviet Jews serve as an integral 
bargaining element for the Soviet Union 
when they sit down with their Western 
counterparts. The emigration figures for 
Soviet Jews reflect the periods of relaxed 
Eest-West relations as well as the periods 
of polarized relations. Thus, the West 
must take steps, such as economic retalia-
tion, to afford themselves parity with the 
Soviets on this issue. But the fact remains 
that detente is a delicate process in which 
gradual reform, rather than instant results, 
is the order of the day. 
Neither detente, international law, 
world public opinion, nor rataliation have 
proven to be a "wonder drug" for the 
Soviet Jews attempting to emigrate. Yet, 
they all serve a useful purpose in the pro-
cess of eroding the Soviet policy which 
has been predominant for decades. They 
also serve the purpose of reaching a solu-
tion by peace. The chill from the Cold 
War period still lingers in East-West rela-
tions, and influences the delicate deci-
sions presently made by the Superpowers. 
Therefore, only national and well 
thought out plans should be utilized in 
aiding the Jews in the Soviet Union. This 
is not to imply that the voice of the world 
should be toned down, nor that the West 
should not be relentless in bringing the 
Soviets to the bargaining table. The major 
import of this caveat is to highlight the 
razor's edge which exists between 
peaceful co-existence and polarity in East-
West relations. 
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